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Abstract 
 
Over the last decade, a large body of tax accounting literature on the association between 
book-tax conformity (BTC)/book-tax differences (BTD) and firms’ opportunistic reporting 
behavior has emerged. Yet, existing empirical evidence on the questions whether increased 
book-tax conformity actually reduces Earnings Management (EM) and/or Tax Sheltering (TS) 
and whether book-tax differences are really indicative of such opportunistic reporting 
behavior is not yet clear. We therefore conduct a meta-analysis aimed at identifying the 
sources of heterogeneity in primary studies and at providing a consensus estimate with respect 
to the sign and the statistical significance level for the examined association. Our qualitative 
literature review reveals that major sources of heterogeneity in the study design include 
differences in the proxies for EM and TS and in the measures used to determine BTD and 
BTC. Our meta-regression results show that BTD are indeed indicative of opportunistic 
reporting behavior, and even more so of EM. These results are, however, weaker for studies 
that determine BTD only roughly as the difference between book and estimated taxable 
income instead of using more specific BTD proxies. Moreover, examining actual BTD 
computed from tax returns instead of only approximating these from financial statements 
strongly increases the effects. Hence, efforts taken to accurately determine BTD seem to be 
worth wile when it comes to the explanatory power for opportunistic reporting. Furthermore, 
our results suggest a negative association between book-tax conformity and EM/TS, which 
we interpret as an indicator for higher conformity indeed being effective in reducing 
aggressive reporting. 
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1. Introduction 
The observed increase in differences between book and taxable income (Book-Tax 
Differences, BTD) as well as various reporting scandals in the US have triggered an intense 
discussion on the appropriate degree of Book-Tax Conformity (BTC), i.e. the degree to which 
book and tax accounting should be aligned. In particular, it is largely unclear to what extent 
book-tax differences relate to deterministic deviations between financial and tax accounting or 
rather to “aggressiveness” in either or both book and tax reporting. At the same time, it also is 
uncertain whether increased book-tax conformity would actually reduce Earnings 
Management (EM) and/or Tax Sheltering (TS) and whether book-tax differences are really 
indicative of such opportunistic reporting behavior.  
Over the last decade, a large body of tax accounting literature on these issues has emerged. 
The empirical evidence is, however, not yet clear. While recent evidence provided by Watrin 
et al. (2014) and Blaylock et al. (2015), for instance, finds that book-tax conformity is 
associated with significantly more earnings management, Tang (2015) concludes that high 
book-tax conformity deters overall earnings management and tax avoidance. Furthermore, 
existing studies partly report opposing results with respect to the influence of BTD on 
earnings management and/or tax sheltering. While some studies determine a significant 
positive association between BTD and opportunistic reporting (e.g. Wilson (2009)), other 
papers report no significant (e.g. Lisowsky et al. (2013)) or even a significant negative 
relation (e.g. Lennox et al. (2013)). Hence, the question arises whether particular study 
characteristics could explain these differences in outcomes. In that regard, major sources of 
heterogeneity in the study design include differences in the proxies for EM and TS and in the 
measures used to determine BTD and BTC. Measures for EM and TS, for example, include 
accruals, indicator variables for detected or alleged fraud, or tax contingencies. With respect 
to BTD, most studies rely on proxies such as the total difference between book and estimated 
taxable income while others use more specific measures targeted at capturing EM/TS more 
precisely. Moreover, a major challenge for most investigations constitutes the fact that actual 
tax return data is not available. As a consequence, in the majority of studies BTD are 
approximated from publicly available financial statement information, whereas only a few 
studies are based on observed BTD upon tax return data availability.  
The contribution of our meta-analysis therefore is - beyond a qualitative literature review - to 
quantify the impact of these sources of heterogeneity in study design with respect to the sign 
and statistical significance of the association between BTD/BTC and EM/TS. To this end, we 
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employ meta regression analysis (MRA) as an innovative tool in the empirical accounting 
literature (Pomeroy and Thornton (2008)). This approach is aimed at clarifying the 
interpretation of opposing outcomes and at providing guidelines for future studies on this 
topic.  
In particular, our findings show that BTD are indeed indicative of both EM and TS, and even 
more so of EM. These results are, however, weaker for studies that only determine BTD 
roughly as the difference between book and estimated taxable income instead of using more 
specific BTD proxies. Moreover, examining actual BTD computed from tax returns instead of 
only approximating these from financial statements strongly increases the effects. Hence, 
efforts taken to accurately determine BTD seem to be worth wile when it comes to the 
explanatory power for opportunistic reporting. Furthermore, our results suggest a negative 
association between book-tax conformity and EM/TS which we interpret as an indicator for 
higher conformity being indeed effective in reducing aggressive reporting.  
The paper continues as follows: Chapter 2 contains a comprehensive literature review with 
regard to the association between BTD and EM/TS and demonstrates the existing 
heterogeneity in previous studies with regard to the measurement of BTD/BTC and EM/TS. 
Chapter 3 describes the procedures and methodology used for our quantitative meta-analysis. 
The results of our study are presented and discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes. 
2. Qualitative Literature Analysis: Association between BTD/BTC and Proxies for Tax 
Sheltering and/or Earnings Management 
There has been a long-standing debate among tax experts and legislators regarding the 
appropriate degree of book-tax conformity, i.e. the extent to which book and tax accounting 
should be aligned. 1 In that regard, proponents of increased book-tax conformity (Desai 
(2003) and Desai (2005); Whitaker (2005); Shaviro (2009); Yin (2001)) posit that it would 
constrain managers’ scope and incentives for aggressively reporting on both financial and 
taxable income as a result of the book-tax trade-off,2 thereby enhancing earnings quality, tax 
compliance and transparency. Opponents (Hanlon et al. (2005); Hanlon and Shevlin (2005); 
Hanlon et al. (2008); McClelland and Mills (2007)) of increased book-tax conformity, 
however, emphasize the divergent objectives of both reporting lines and expect that book-tax 
conformity would result in a decrease of accounting information available to the public and, 
1  For an extensive discussion on the pros and cons of book-tax conformity, see for instance Hanlon and 
Maydew (2009); McClelland and Mills (2007). 
2  Generally speaking, managers would have to trade-off high book income vs. low taxable income. 
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hence, in a decrease of earnings quality (Hanlon et al. (2005); Ali and Hwang (2000); 
Guenther and Young (2000), Hanlon et al. (2008)).  
Generally speaking, divergent reporting in financial and tax accounts gives rise to book-tax 
differences. The extent of BTD, in turn, presumably depends on the level of BTC in a given 
country. Specifically, the lower the conformity level, the higher is the expected scope for 
BTD.  
According to Desai and Dharmapala (2009), the measured book-tax gap can – apart from 
deterministic differences between tax and financial accounting – be attributed to either 
downward managing of taxable income (tax sheltering/avoidance) or over-reporting of 
financial income (earnings management).3 There is a great variety of empirical papers which 
examine precisely this relation and test for a potential association between BTD/BTC and 
proxies for TS and/or EM.4 Most of these individual studies estimate models whose 
specifications roughly resemble the following equation: 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑋𝑋∅ + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝜗𝜗 
(1) 
where Y is a measure of EM or TS, X a vector of control variables including a constant, BTD a 
measure of BTD or BTC, and ϑ an error term. 
Table 1 first of all provides an overview of the identified studies on this topic and summarizes 
the papers with respect to their authors, title, year and journal of publication, sample period, 
country and size as well as, most importantly, the utilized EM/TS and BTD/BTC measures. 
3  For more information on that see Desai and Dharmapala (2009), p. 540. 
4  There are, however, only very few studies which examine the effects of BTD on the interplay of earnings 
management and tax sheltering. For examples see Tang (2015); Frank et al. (2009). 
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Table 1: Overview of studies with BTD as a proxy for Tax Sheltering and/or Earnings management 
Authors Title Year Publication Period Country 
Sample 
Size Topic 
Dependent 
variable 
BTD or 
BTC? BTD/BTC measure(s) 
Wilson An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter 
Participants 
2009 TAR 1975-2002 U.S. 118 TS TS indicator BTD Total BTD  
BTD w/o tax shelt. 
Permanent BTD  
Temporary BTD 
Desai, Dharmapala Corporate tax avoidance and firm value 2009 REST 1993-2001 U.S. 4,985 TS TS indicator BTD Total BTD 
Gallemore, Maydew, 
Thorncock 
The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance 2014 CAR 1995-2001 U.S. 84 TS TS indicator BTD Total BTD 
Lisowsky Seeking Shelter: Empirically Modeling Tax 
Shelters using Financial Statement 
Information 
2010 TAR 2000-2004 U.S. 9,223 TS TS indicator BTD Total BTD  
DTAX 
Lisowksy, Robinson, 
Schmidt 
Do Publicly Disclosed Tax Reserves Tell 
Us About Privately Disclosed Tax Shelter 
Activity? 
2013 JAR 2006-2009 U.S. 3,262 TS TS indicator BTD Total BTD 
Permanent BTD 
DTAX 
Mills Book-Tax Differences and Internal 
Revenue Service Adjustments 
1998 JAR 1982-1992 U.S. 525 TS Audit 
adjustments 
BTD Total BTD  
Temporary BTD 
Chen, Gavious, Josef The Relationship Between the Management 
of Book Income and Taxable Income Under 
a Moderate Level of Book-Tax Conformity 
2013 JAAF 1994-2007 Isreal 313 TS 
(and 
EM) 
Audit 
adjustments 
BTD Total BTD 
Cho, Wong, Wong Book-Tax Differences and Inland Revenue 
Audit Adjustments in New Zealand 
2006 JBFA 1991-2000 New 
Zealand 
81 TS Audit 
adjustments 
BTD Total BTD  
Temporary BTD 
Mills, Sansing Strategic Tax and Finanical Reporting 
Decisions: Theory and Evidence 
2000 CAR 1982-1992 U.S. 481 TS Audit 
adjustments 
BTD Total BTD 
Tang An empirical analysis of book-tax reporting 
difference and tax noncompliance behavior 
in China 
2005 Thesis 1998-2003 China 1,251 TS Audit 
adjustments 
BTD Total BTD 
Chan, Lin, Mo Will a departure from tax-based accounting 
encourage tax noncompliance? Archival 
evidence from a transition economy 
2010 JAE 1996-2003 China 1,286 TS Audit 
adjustments 
BTD Total BTD 
Frischmann, Shevlin, 
Wilson 
Economic Consequences of Increasing the 
Conformity in Accounting for Uncertain 
Tax Benefits 
2008 JAE 2007 U.S. 354 TS Tax 
contingencies 
BTD Total BTD 
Cazier, Rego, Tian, 
Wilson 
Early Evidence on the Determinants of 
Unrecognized Tax Benefits 
2009 WP 2007 U.S. 566 TS Tax 
contingencies 
BTD Total BTD 
Permanent BTD 
DTAX 
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Blouin, Tuna Tax Contingencies: Cushioning the blow to 
earnings? 
2007 WP 1997-2004 U.S. 6,343 TS 
(and 
EM) 
Tax 
contingencies 
BTD Total BTD 
Temporary BTD 
Atwood, Drake, 
Myers, Myers 
Home Country Tax System Characteristics 
and Corporate Tax Avoidance: 
International Evidence 
2012 TAR 1993-2007 22 
countries 
69,301 TS Reduction in 
taxes paid 
BTC BTC measure Atwood 
Kraft Management Earnings Forecasts and Book-
Tax Differences 
2015 IJEF 1995-2010 U.S. 16,224 EM Meeting 
earnings 
forecasts 
BTD Total BTD 
Discretionary BTD 
DD BTD 
Philipps, Pincus, Rego, 
Wan 
Decomposing Changes in Deferred Tax 
Assets and Liabilities to Isolate Earnings 
Management Activities 
2004 JATA 1994-2000 U.S. 396 EM Meeting 
earnings 
forecasts 
BTD Temporary BTD 
Phillips, Pincus, Rego Earnings Management: New Evidece Based 
on Deferred Tax Expense 
2003 TAR 1994-2000 U.S. 4,139 EM Meeting 
earnings 
forecasts 
BTD Temporary BTD 
Badertscher, Phillipps, 
Pincus, Rego  
Earnings Management Strategies and the 
Trade-Off between Tax Benefits and 
Detection Risk: To Conform or Not to 
Conform? 
2009 TAR 1997-2002 U.S. 8,099 EM Financial 
statement 
fraud 
BTD Total BTD 
Lennox, Lisowsky, 
Pittmann 
Tax Aggressiveness and Accounting Fraud 2013 JAR 1981-2001 U.S. 126,273 EM 
(and 
TS) 
Financial 
statement 
fraud 
BTD Total BTD 
Permanent BTD 
DTAX 
Ettredge, Sun, Lee, 
Anandarajan 
Is Earnings Fraud Associated with High 
Deferred Tax and/or Book Minus Tax 
Levels? 
2008 AJPT 1988-2002 U.S. 130 EM Financial 
statement 
fraud 
BTD Temporary BTD 
Total BTD 
Watrin, Pott, Ullmann The effects of book-tax conformity and tax 
accounting incentives on financial 
accounting: evidene from public and private 
limited companies in Germany 
2012 IJAAPE 1993-2004 Germany 1,778 EM Discretionary 
accruals  
BTD Total BTD 
Burgstahler, Hail, 
Leuz 
The Importance of Reporting Incentives: 
Earnings Management in European Private 
and Public Firms 
2006 TAR 1997-2003 13 
European 
countries 
269 EM EM indicator 
Leuz et al. 
BTC Binary indicator 
Blaylock, Gaertner, 
Shevlin 
The association between book-tax 
conformity and earnings management 
2015 RAST 1996-2007 34 
countries 
362 EM EM indicator 
Leuz et al. 
Discretionary 
accruals 
BTC BTC measure Atwood 
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Watrin, Ebert, 
Thomsen 
Book-Tax Conformity and Earnings 
Management: Insights from European One- 
and Two-Book Systems 
2014 JATA 2004-2011 27 
European 
countries 
26,708 EM  Discretionary 
accruals  
BTC Binary indicator 
BTC measure Watrin 
Tang Does Book-Tax Conformity Deter 
Opportunistic Book and Tax reporting? An 
International Analysis 
2015 EAR 1994-2007 32 
countries 
372 EM 
and TS 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Reduction in 
taxes paid 
BTC BTC measure Tang 
BTC measure Atwood 
Frank, Lynch, Rego Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its 
Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting 
2009 TAR 1991-2005 U.S. 156 
45,235 
TS and 
EM 
TS indicator 
Discretionary 
accruals  
BTD DTAX 
Total BTD 
DD BTD 
Please refer to Table 5 in the Appendix for journal abbreviations. Sample size indicates the largest number of observations in a respective paper with BTD included as explanatory 
variable. “EM” signifies Earnings Management; “TS” signifies Tax sheltering. The categorization of the topic is based on our own assessment of the analyzed papers. “DTAX” refers 
to Discretionary Permanent BTD; “DD BTD” refers to Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) Discretionary BTD measure; “BTD w/o tax shelt.” refers to BTD with the effect of tax 
sheltering removed.  
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Table 1 sub-groups studies according to their dependent variables, i.e. by whether and how 
EM or TS is measured (see dashed and bold lines). In a second step, papers are clustered by 
their independent variables, i.e. by the BTD or BTC measure(s) relied upon. In this regard, 
several studies not only examine one single measure, but use a set of (BTD) variables (e.g. 
Wilson (2009); Frank et al. (2009); Cazier et al. (2009); Lennox et al. (2013); Lisowsky et al. 
(2013)). 
Overall, the empirical evidence provided by these existing studies is rather heterogeneous. 
Firstly, recent evidence provided by Watrin et al. (2014) and Blaylock et al. (2015) 
demonstrates that book-tax conformity is associated with significantly more earnings 
management, whereas Tang (2015) finds that high book-tax conformity reduces overall 
earnings management and tax avoidance. Secondly, some studies determine a significant 
positive association between BTD and opportunistic reporting (Wilson (2009)), while other 
papers report no significant (Lisowsky et al. (2013)) or even a significant negative relation 
(Lennox et al. (2013)). Hence, the question arises whether particular study characteristics 
could explain these differences in outcomes. In that respect, heterogeneity in the study design 
particularly relates to differences in the measures used to determine BTD and BTC and in the 
proxies used to capture EM and TS. These measures are discussed comprehensively in the 
following.  
Types of BTD  
There exist several measures of BTD (see Table 2) that are employed in the empirical tax 
accounting literature. Some BTD measures are specifically constructed so as to capture or to 
account for aggressiveness in financial and/or tax reporting; other measures are defined more 
broadly and also entail items that are not considered to be used by firms for aggressive 
reporting. As Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) point out, it is, however, “often not clear why a 
particular measure is used for the research question at hand”.  
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 Table 2: BTD measures used in the empirical tax accounting literature 
BTD Measure Author(s) Computation Description 
Total BTD Manzon and Plesko (2002) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 − ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐
𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 −(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐−1))  Pretax book income – grossed up tax expense, i.e. the total difference between book and taxable income 
Temporary BTD - 
𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃  Temporary BTD 
Permanent BTD - 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 Differences between book and taxable income that do not reverse over time 
DTAX Frank et al. (2009) 
Error term from the following regression: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐=  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 +  𝛾𝛾
∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 
Discretionary permanent differences 
 
Residual from regression of total 
permanent BTD on non-discretionary 
items that are known to cause permanent 
differences as well as on other statutory 
adjustments 
Discretionary Total BTD Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
Error term from the following regression:  
 
𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐 =  𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖+  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐 
Part of Total BTD that can be attributed to 
tax avoidance and not earnings 
management; residual from regression of 
Total BTD on total accruals 
BTD with the effect of tax 
sheltering removed Wilson (2009) 
Total BTD – effect of tax benefits: 
 
𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
BTD without the effect of tax sheltering; 
deduction from the Total BTD of the 
effect, i.e. the tax savings, of tax benefits 
Source: Own representation, based on Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). “BTD” signifies Book-Tax Difference; “DTAX” refers to Discretionary Permanent BTD; “NOL” signifies Net Operating 
Loss Carryforward.  
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Total BTD (used in 20 studies) represent the most comprehensive measure and capture both 
temporary and permanent BTD. Absent tax return data, they are mostly computed from 
financial statement information as the difference between pre-tax book income and estimated 
taxable income. Following Manzon and Plesko (2002), taxable income is mostly 
approximated by grossing up the current tax expense with the statutory tax rate.5 Though the 
Total BTD measure is appealing with regard to its straightforward computation, it has been 
posited that it is subject to substantial measurement error, given various problems associated 
with estimating taxable income from financial statements (Hanlon (2003)). These problems 
are for instance related to different consolidation rules for book and tax purposes, tax credits, 
foreign operations or loss firms.6  
Apart from this basic BTD measure, the empirical literature has come up with some more 
precise BTD proxies that are designed to specifically account for aggressiveness in either or 
both financial and tax reporting. 
Temporary BTD (used in 7 studies) emerge as a result of differences between book and 
taxable income with regard to the timing of accrual income and expense items. They can be 
measured by grossing up the deferred tax expense with the statutory tax rate (e.g. Moore 
(2012)). Temporary BTD are considered to entail information about potential management of 
non-tax accruals such as depreciation (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 132).7  
Permanent BTD (used in 4 studies), constituting the conceptual counterpart to temporary 
BTD, result from differences between book and taxable income that do not reverse over time. 
Permanent BTD are usually computed as the difference between estimated Total BTD and 
Temporary BTD (e.g. Wilson (2009); Lisowsky et al. (2013)). In the literature, it has been 
brought forward that an “ideal” tax shelter features such Permanent BTD (Plesko (2004); 
Frank et al. (2009); Shevlin (2002)),8 as they decrease taxable income and effectively reduce 
ETRs without affecting financial income reported to shareholders. Hence, Permanent BTD 
could be indicative of aggressive tax reporting. Indeed, Wilson (2009) for instance 
5  A refined approach and more details on the computation are for example provided by Wilson (2009).  
6  For more details, also see Hanlon and Heitzman (2010); Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Moreover, Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010) posit that Total BTD also include Permanent BTD that are not related to accounting 
accruals as well as items that do not really represent BTD. They therefore conclude that Total BTD may not 
be appropriate to examine “whether information in the tax expense is indicative of earnings management in 
other pre-tax accruals”.  
7  Other non-tax accruals include e.g. the warranty and bad debt expense.  
8  As an example for the German institutional context, internally generated intangible assets must not be 
recognized in tax balance sheets, but recognition in single financial accounts is optional. Hence, in case these 
assets are recognized in single financial statements, income is increased without raising taxable income, see 
Watrin et al. (2014), p. 66. 
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demonstrates that most tax shelters generate Permanent BTD. However, Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) claim the notion of Permanent BTD being more indicative of tax 
aggressiveness than Temporary BTD overall to be “unsupported” by empirical evidence.  
A frequently used measure is the Discretionary permanent differences (DTAX) measure 
(used in 5 studies) developed by Frank et al. (2009). Targeted at quantifying “discretionary 
permanent differences”, it is considered as a measure of tax reporting aggressiveness. Frank et 
al. (2009) base their proxy on permanent BTD (rather than total BTD) also arguing that 
anecdotal evidence suggests aggressive tax shelter activity to be rather associated with 
permanent BTD. In doing so, they justify excluding tax planning related to temporary 
differences.9 Furthermore, they contend that permanent BTD “reflect items that are not 
considered aggressive tax reporting”, such as changes in the tax cushion, changes in the 
valuation allowance, goodwill and other intangible assets or tax credits. Therefore, DTAX is 
estimated by regressing total permanent BTD on these non-discretionary items that are known 
to cause permanent differences as well as on other statutory adjustments10 that are likely 
unrelated to tax aggressiveness. Specifically, discretionary permanent differences (DTAX) are 
the residual from this regression. This residual is supposed to capture intentional tax 
aggressiveness, after determinants that are not related to tax aggressiveness have been 
removed. Conceptually, this discretionary measure intends to cover items that decrease the 
firm’s ETR, i.e. items that reduce taxable income and increase accounting earnings (Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010), p. 142).11 According to Frank et al. (2009), this kind of captured tax 
planning could or could not be considered fraudulent tax evasion (Frank et al. (2009), p. 468). 
Similarly, Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) Discretionary Total BTD measure (used in 2 
studies) constitutes a discretionary measure of tax reporting aggressiveness. More precisely, 
this proxy elicits that part of Total BTD that can be attributed to tax avoidance and not 
earnings management; i.e. it determines an abnormal BTD after the impact of total accruals is 
removed. Specifically, Desai and Dharmapala proceed as follows: First, they estimate Total 
BTD according to the methodology of Manzon and Plesko (2002). Then, Total BTD are 
9  Furthermore, Frank et al. (2009) argue that temporary differences also reflect earnings management via pre-
tax accruals (also see Phillips et al. (2003) and Hanlon (2005) on this). As their study also examines how tax 
aggressiveness relates to pre-tax earnings management, they posit that they avoid spurious correlation 
between temporary BTD and pre-tax earnings management (and thus: spurious correlation between earnings 
management and tax aggressiveness) by excluding those temporary BTD from DTAX. Frank et al. (2009) 
contend that avoiding this kind of spurious correlation outweighs the costs of excluding tax planning 
associated with temporary BTD.  
10  Frank et al. (2009) name state taxes as an example for such statutory adjustments. 
11  Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) argue, however, that Frank et al.’s (2009) terminology for permanent BTD is 
“somewhat unfortunate”, contending that it captures more than permanent BTD.  
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regressed on total accruals intended to capture earnings management. The residual from this 
regression, i.e. the component of Total BTD that cannot be explained by variations in total 
accruals, is determined to be a measure of tax avoidance activity. 12. 
Finally, Wilson (2009) adopts quite a different approach to estimate BTD with the effect of 
tax sheltering removed. His approach is based on a sample of firms that were accused of 
having engaged in a tax shelter by the Treasury or by the Press. In particular, Wilson (2009) 
deducts from the Total BTD the effect, i.e. the tax savings, of tax benefits using information 
from the footnotes to the financial statements. To this end, he grosses up the identified federal 
tax savings by the applicable statutory corporate income tax rate and deducts it from the 
firms’ Total BTD to obtain this revised BTD estimate. Ultimately, his approach aims at 
comparing BTD of tax shelter firms to those of non-shelter firms.13 
BTC measures 
Book-tax conformity pertains to the degree to which book and tax accounting are aligned and 
thus also to the extent to which there is room for book-tax differences to occur. The effects of 
BTC, for instance with regard to earnings management and tax sheltering, have mostly been 
studied by means of cross-country studies aimed at capturing differing levels of BTC across 
various countries. This follows the rationale that the amount of flexibility that firms have to 
report BTD varies across jurisdictions (Atwood et al. (2012), p. 1834). Early studies on book-
tax conformity (Alford et al. (1993); Hung (2001); Ali and Hwang (2000); Guenther and 
Young (2000); Leuz et al. (2003); Burgstahler et al. (2006)) simply categorize the 
contemplated countries as having either high or low conformity. This categorization is derived 
from law, representing the perceived extent to which accounting provisions of the tax law 
conform to financial accounting standards (Watrin et al. (2014), p. 56). Hence, this measure is 
rather subjective and not of an empirical nature (Tang (2015), p. 443).  
In contrast to that, Atwood et al. (2010) develop a comprehensive measure of the required 
level of BTC in a given country (used in 3 studies). They define BTC as “the flexibility that a 
firm has to report taxable income (TI) that is different from pre-tax book income (PTBI)” and 
base their measure on the conditional variance of current tax expense (CTE) (as of 
12  Based on Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) approach, Kraft (2015) constructs another measure of 
Discretionary BTD, which is intended to capture both earnings management and tax avoidance. To that end, 
Kraft (2015) partitions total accruals into normal accruals and discretionary accruals using the model of 
Dechow et al. (2003). She then regresses Total BTD on normal accruals, arguing that the residual from this 
regression reflects Discretionary BTD that comprise earnings management and tax avoidance. Kraft’s 
measure has not, however, been used in other studies yet.  
13  Indeed, Wilson (2009) finds that BTDs are no longer significantly different from those of the non-shelter 
control firms when tax savings generated by tax shelters are taken into account. 
11 
 
                                                          
consolidated financial statements) for a given level of pre-tax book income.14 In particular, 
they rely on the root mean-squared error (RMSE) from a country-year regression of CTE on 
PTBI as it provides an unbiased estimate of the standard error of the regression. 
Consequently, countries featuring a lower RMSE are assumed to have less flexibility in tax 
reporting and in employing strategies that generate BTD, and thus, face higher BTC. In fact, 
countries are ranked according to their RMSE such that countries with higher rankings in a 
given year feature a higher BTC.15  
While Atwood et al.’s measure is based on data from consolidated financial statements, 
Watrin et al. (2014) develop a BTC measure that is based on the relation between single 
financial statements and tax accounts. They substantiate their approach arguing that in most 
European high conformity countries taxable income determination is related to single 
financial statements. Watrin et al.’s measure is based on permanent BTD, computed at the 
single entity level and aggregated at the country level. Specifically, per country and year, they 
compute the mean of all absolute values of permanent BTD. Thereafter, they assign a rank to 
each country in each year based on the mean permanent BTD such that countries with higher 
rankings exhibit higher BTC.16 Obviously, the larger the BTD, the lower is the level of book-
tax conformity. 
Finally, another empirical proxy for mandated book-tax conformity was developed by Tang 
(2015). Precisely, Tang (2015) defines required BTC as the amount of variation in temporary 
and permanent BTD “that cannot be explained by opportunistic book and tax reporting for 
firms in a given country and year”. To determine mandated BTD, Tang (2015) first of all aims 
at disentangling BTD relating to legal differences between financial and tax accounting from 
BTD relating to opportunistic book and tax reporting. To that end, she regresses BTD on a 
proxy for earnings management (discretionary accruals) and on a proxy for tax avoidance (the 
difference between the statutory tax rate and the effective tax rate) and their interaction term. 
Tang (2015) then uses the root-mean-squared errors from this regression as a measure of the 
degree to which book and tax income deviate due to rule differences, thus reflecting a 
country’s level of mandatory conformity. 
14  Given that Atwood et al. (2010) examine the association between CTE and PTBI, their measure is most 
likely closest related to Total BTD. 
15  Atwood et al. (2010) use descending ranks, i.e. the highest RMSE is assigned a value of zero, and the lowest 
RMSE is ranked n-1, with n being the number of countries included in a given year. These rankings are 
divided by n-1 thereafter to scale these to be between zero and one. 
16  Watrin et al. (2014) employ the same descending ranking procedure like Atwood et al. (2010), i.e. they also 
yield BTC ranks that range between zero and one. 
12 
 
                                                          
BTD: Measured vs. approximated 
Computing BTD obviously requires an estimate of taxable income. Taxable income is 
reported on tax returns and financial statements include information on the tax expense as 
well as on tax assets and liabilities, such as deferred taxes. Theoretically, estimates of taxable 
income could therefore be derived from both tax returns and financial statements. However, 
tax returns are usually not publicly accessible and thus only a few empirical investigations are 
based on such actual tax return data.17 In the absence of tax return data, most studies rely on 
proxies for tax positions estimated from financial statements. For instance, as outlined above, 
a common approach to approximate taxable income is to gross up the current tax expense on 
the income statement by the statutory tax rate. However, deriving estimates of taxable income 
from financial statements comes along with various problems.18 Essentially, tax disclosures in 
financial statements are insufficient to draw valid conclusions about taxable income and 
actual taxes paid in a given fiscal year (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 139), i.e. additional 
disclosures would be necessary to enable these computations. At the same time, however, it is 
also unclear whether the availability of tax return data would actually be helpful to overcome 
all of these measurement errors. In that regard, divergent consolidation rules for book and tax 
purposes constitute a major problem (Hanlon (2003); Mills and Plesko (2003)). As Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010) argue, it is very difficult to match tax returns with the associated 
financial statement(s). Hence, it could often remain unclear how much tax is actually paid on 
reported accounting earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 139). 
Tax Sheltering Measures 
To date, there has been no universally accepted definition of tax avoidance or tax 
aggressiveness (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 137) and thus no generally valid TS 
measure. According to Dyreng et al. (2008), tax avoidance is broadly defined as (legal and 
illegal) strategies to decrease and minimize taxes. Therefore, tax reporting aggressiveness is 
supposed to reflect a broad range of activities, e.g. transfer pricing arrangements, location of 
intangible property in low tax locations, utilization of flow-through entities in structured 
transactions, synthetic lease arrangements and tax shelter transactions (Frank et al. (2009)). 
17  Examples include Lisowsky (2009); Mills (1996); Mills and Newberry (2001); Mills et al. (2002) and Plesko  
(2007). 
18  Hanlon (2003) and McGill and Outslay (2004) extensively discuss these issues. 
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For purposes of this study, we determine tax sheltering as any activity, both legal and illegal, 
aimed at reducing the tax liability in the framework of tax accounting.19  
In the assessed studies, four different categories of tax sheltering measures can be identified:  
(1)  Indicator variable for firms accused of engaging in a tax shelter;  
(2)  (tax) audit adjustments;  
(3)  tax contingencies;  
(4)  reduction in taxes paid. 
The first measure, which captures whether a firm is identified as being currently engaged in 
tax sheltering, is used by six of the papers. This TS proxy is either designed as a binary 
variable, indicating whether a firm is alleged to have tax shelter activity or not, or a 
probability measure specifying the likelihood of being a tax shelter firm. In most cases, the 
analyses are based on a sample constructed by Graham and Tucker (2006) who identified 43 
public corporations accused of tax sheltering by searching publicly available court records 
and press articles between 1975 and 2000. Several papers extend their sample by identifying 
further tax sheltering companies via firms’ disclosures, the press or Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) confidential data. Wilson (2009), for example, uses the Factiva Database to determine 
eighteen additional corporate tax shelter participants and Gallemore et al. (2014) obtain 61 
other observations for the COLI (Corporate-owned life insurance) tax shelter.20 Lisowsky 
(2010) and Lisowksy et al. (2013), in contrast, exploit a new expanded data set from the 
Office of Tax Shelter Analysis (OTSA) established by the IRS.21 This data captures several 
categories of identified illegal corporate tax shelters.22 Finally, the identified tax shelter firms 
are then compared to a sample of matched control firms to identify systematic differences.  
A second group of papers (six studies) uses tax audit adjustments, being a rather direct 
measure of a firm’s tax avoidance determined by the tax authorities in the firm’s final tax 
assessments. This TS proxy is based on the discrepancy between the final taxable income 
19  Hence, this does not include multinational profit shifting, i.e. the exploitation of international tax rate 
differentials. 
20  The COLI shelter involved firms taking out life insurance policies on their rank-and-file employees and then 
receiving the death benefits if the employee died. The COLI shelter was the subject of unflattering coverage 
in the media, including the Wall Street Journal, which identified the companies that engaged in COLI 
alongside pictures of their actual deceased employees. COLI shelters are, therefore, an example of a tax 
avoidance strategy that many viewed as particularly aggressive and that resulted in adverse scrutiny for ﬁrms 
that engaged in them, see Gallemore et al. (2014), p. 1106. 
21  The OTSA was established to combat the rise of tax shelters in the late 1990s. 
22  Regulations under IRC §6011 require a firm to attach a form to its tax return for each “reportable 
transaction”. 
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ascertained by the tax authorities and the taxable income previously reported by the firm in 
the tax return. Chan et al. (2010) additionally distinguish between book-tax conforming audit 
adjustments, capturing corrections of misstatements arising from violations of both financial 
and tax reporting regulations, and book-tax difference audit adjustments, measuring violations 
of tax rules only. Moreover, some papers apply scaled (by beginning total assets (see Cho et 
al. (2006); Mills and Sansing (2000)); by sales revenue (see Chan et al. (2010)) or logarithmic 
(see Tang (2005))) audit adjustment variables. Remarkably, all of the authors using this type 
of TS measure had access to (confidential) data from tax returns and tax audit results received 
from tax authorities in several countries (e.g. Mills (1998) for US; Chen et al. (2013) for 
Israel; Cho et al. (2006) for New Zealand; Tang (2015) and Chan et al. (2010) for China). 
The third subgroup of studies utilizes tax contingencies as a proxy for tax aggressiveness (one 
published and two working papers). To be more specific, two papers (Frischmann et al. 
(2008) and Cazier et al. (2009)) exploit the FIN 48 contingency for unrecognized tax benefits 
(UTB),23 whereas Blouin and Tuna (2007) investigate the tax cushion24 representing loss 
contingencies as defined in FAS 5.25 The rationale behind these TS measures is that they 
constitute uncertain tax positions, i.e. management believes that these tax positions will be 
most likely challenged if examined by the relevant tax authorities. Therefore, the amount of 
the tax contingency equals the additional tax liability which firms expect to pay in case they 
are audited. 
The last identified measure of tax avoidance is the reduction in explicit taxes paid (two 
papers) which can be defined as the difference between a firm’s “unmanaged tax amount”, 
captured by e.g. the home-country statutory corporate tax rate times pre-tax earnings, and its 
“managed tax amount”, i.e. its current taxes paid (Atwood et al. (2012)). This difference is 
intended to reflect how aggressively managers pursue strategies to reduce the total amount of 
taxes of a firm. Tang (2015), for example, uses an aggregate of two such proxies based on 
different definitions of the current tax expense variable at country-level.26 
Earnings Management Measures 
Aggressive financial reporting can broadly be defined as upward or downward earnings 
management that may or may not be within the limits of GAAP (Frank et al. (2009)). Four 
23  For more information on the provisions and procedure of FIN 48, see Frischmann et al. (2008), p. 2f. 
24  For more information on the measurement of the tax cushion, see Blouin and Tuna (2007), p. 7.  
25  For more information on the differences between FAS 5 and FIN 48, see Lloyd et al. (2009).  
26  She uses the ratio of current tax expense to operating cash flows to capture both non-conforming and 
conforming tax avoidance, whereas she exploits the ratio of current tax expense to pretax income in order to 
identify only non-conforming tax avoidance. 
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different categories of measures, which intend to capture precisely such earnings management 
behavior, have been determined in the outlined papers:  
(1)  Meeting earnings forecasts;  
(2)  financial statement fraud;  
(3)  EM indicator variable according to Leuz et al. (2003);  
(4)  discretionary accruals. 
There are three studies which use variables for meeting analysts’ expectations as EM proxies. 
Kraft (2015), for example, tries to detect earnings management by quantifying the likelihood 
of meeting management earnings forecasts via the odds ratio, i.e. the ratio of the probability 
of meeting management earnings forecasts to the probability of missing these forecasts. 
Philipps et al. (2003, 2004) adopt an even broader approach. Specifically, the authors intend 
to reveal earnings management aimed at meeting three earnings targets: (1) to avoid reporting 
an earnings decline, (2) to avoid reporting a loss, and (3) to avoid failing to meet analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. They employ scaled changes in annual earnings as variable of interest and 
compare firm-years with zero or slightly positive earnings levels to a control sample of firm-
years with slightly negative earnings. 
A second subgroup of studies makes use of firms identified of having committed financial 
statement fraud (3 studies). This proxy represents an extreme case of earnings management 
and is basically designed as binary variable, capturing whether a firm is engaged in fraudulent 
overstatement of earnings, or a probability measure indicating the likelihood that a firm 
carries out such extreme EM practices. Thus, it is largely comparable to the first outlined TS 
measure (indicator variable for firms accused of engaging in a tax shelter). Badertscher et al. 
(2009), for example, exploit a sample of firms obtained from the GAO (General 
Accounting/Government Accountability Office) report27 that restated their earnings 
downward due to accounting irregularities and thus can be presumed to have managed 
earnings upward beforehand.28 Lennox et al. (2013) and Ettredge et al. (2008), in contrast, 
examine Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) which outline the results 
of the SEC’s investigations of alleged violations of GAAP. Precisely, their samples consist of 
firms being sanctioned for fraud by the SEC in AAERs as well as control groups of matched 
non-fraud firms. 
27  For an example, see GAO (2002). 
28  In addition, they differentiate between book-tax conforming EM (activities that also have current taxable 
consequences) and non-conforming EM (activities that do not affect current taxable income). 
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A third group of studies bases their measures on an EM indicator variable suggested by Leuz 
et al. (2003) (two papers). This measure constitutes an aggregate of four different proxies 
which are aimed at capturing a variety of earnings management practices: (1) the tendency of 
firms to avoid a small loss29 (measured as the ratio of small profits to small losses); (2) the 
magnitude of total accruals30 relative to the magnitude of operating cash flows; (3) the 
smoothness of earnings relative to cash flows31 (measured as the ratio of the standard 
deviation of operating income divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations) 
and (4) the correlation of accounting accruals and operating cash flows32 (measured as the 
Spearman correlation between changes in total accruals and changes in the cash flow from 
operations). In order to mitigate potential measurement error in individual scores, these sub-
measures are aggregated into one single EM variable. 
In the last subgroup of papers, financial reporting aggressiveness is measured via 
discretionary accruals (five studies). Using this proxy follows the rationale that higher 
discretionary accruals indicate higher levels of opportunistic use of leeway in financial 
accounting, thus capturing both upward and downward earnings management. Most of the 
studies refer to the methodology developed by Jones (1991) and modified by Dechow et al. 
(1995). In doing so, they first of all model total accruals as a function of the difference 
between the change in sales and the change in accounts receivable as well as Property Plant 
and Equipment (non-discretionary accruals).33 Thereby, total accruals are most commonly 
measured as the change in current assets plus the change in short-term debt less the sum of the 
change in current liabilities, the changes in cash and depreciation and amortization 
expenses.34 Discretionary accruals are then defined as the residual of the outlined model, i.e. 
the difference between total and non-discretionary accruals. Watrin et al. (2012, 2014) use, in 
addition to the magnitude of discretionary accruals, an indicator variable for negative values 
of discretionary accruals. Moreover, Tang (2015) substantiates her analysis by providing two 
29  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) find evidence that U.S firms use accounting 
discretion to avoid reporting small losses. 
30  This measure captures overall financial reporting discretion that firms can make use of to mask their 
underlying economic performance. Earnings are then temporarily inflated due to accrual choices, but cash 
flows are unaffected. 
31  This variable captures the extent to which corporate owners and managers reduce the variability of reported 
earnings. By doing so, they are able to conceal changes in their firm’s economic performance. 
32  The rationale behind this proxy is that firms can use accruals to hide bad or to underreport good current 
performance following shocks to the firm’s economic performance. This induces a negative correlation 
between changes in accruals and shocks to operating cash flows. While a negative correlation is a “natural” 
result of accrual accounting, a larger magnitude indicates smoothing of reported earnings (Burgstahler et al. 
(2006)). 
33  All variables are scaled by total assets. For the exact formula, see Frank et al. (2009), p. 479f.  
34  For the formula, see Watrin et al. (2012), p. 285. Frank et al. (2009), by contrast, compute total accruals 
differently according to Hribar and Collins (2002), see Frank et al. (2009), p. 479f.  
17 
 
                                                          
further variations of discretionary accruals, i.e. discretionary revenue as well as discretionary 
current accruals, and also constructs an aggregate measure.35 
3. Meta-Analysis  
As demonstrated by the literature survey, there is substantial heterogeneity in the measures 
used and the outcomes of primary studies. Beyond the qualitative analysis, we intend to go 
one step further and provide quantitative insights on the effects and sources of heterogeneity 
in study design. Furthermore, we derive a consensus estimate with respect to the sign and the 
statistical significance level for the association between BTD and proxies for EM and TS. 
3.1. Purpose of Meta-Analysis and Meta-Studies in Accounting 
Meta-analysis, in general, refers to a set of statistical techniques and quantitative review 
methods used to standardize and synthesize findings across empirical studies (Greenberg 
(1992)). According to Lipsey and Wilson (2001), a properly executed meta-analysis can make 
significant contributions to practice and policy by developing a general knowledge of the 
whole body of research in a given topic. One major goal of a meta-analysis is to identify the 
determinants due to which empirical findings on certain questions significantly vary or are 
even contradictory. An additional advantage compared to narrative literature reviews is that a 
meta-analysis can aggregate data from a large number of coherent studies, thereby increasing 
sample sizes and statistical power and identifying mean relations (with regard to sign and 
strength) among key variables (Pomeroy and Thornton (2008), p.308). In the case of 
heterogeneous findings, specific moderators might account for the variation in correlations 
across studies (Hunter and Schmidt (2004)).36 In order to detect their impact, effect sizes 
measuring the magnitude of the relationship between the dependent variable and a specific 
independent variable reported in primary literature are, in principle, regressed on a set of 
moderator variables which quantify differences in method, design and data used (Feld et al. 
(2013)).  
While several meta-studies have emerged in tax research, e.g. on the influence of taxation on 
FDI or capital structure, over the last years,37 meta-studies in accounting are still rare.38 In this 
regard, Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) identified only 33 existing meta-studies on an 
35  For more information on these variables, see Tang (2015), p. 449f.  
36  Using meta-analysis techniques, the variance that is due to inherent differences between different correlations 
or moderator variables can be distinguished from the variance that is due to statistical artifacts (sampling or 
measurement error), see Brierly (1999). 
37  For examples, see Feld and Heckemeyer (2011); Feld et al. (2013).  
38  One main focus of the existing meta-studies in accounting lies on the interdependencies between audit 
committee characteristics and reporting quality. 
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accounting topics or being published in accounting or auditing journals (thereof only 3 in the 
top-tier journals) compared to for instance 105 meta-studies in Marketing and 233 in 
Management. That seems to be surprising at first glance as empirical studies in accounting 
partly produce contradictory results and meta-analysis techniques generally offer the ideal 
tool to detect the causes for such deviations and to derive more general conclusions. Yet, 
while heterogeneity in study outcomes, research designs and variables motivates meta-study 
analysis, it also constitutes a major methodological challenge at the same time.  
Existing meta-studies in accounting basically focus on the association between two specific 
variables of interest Pomeroy and Thornton (2008), for example, analyze the association 
between audit committee independence and financial reporting quality measures.39 The 
majority of meta-studies in accounting rely on meta-analysis techniques developed by Hunter 
and Schmidt (2000, 2004) or Lipsey and Wilson (2001).40 These are based on the 
computation of mean (and overall) effect sizes41, i.e. on the magnitude of the relationship 
between the dependent variable and a specific independent variable of interest, and the 
conduct of homogeneity analyses (e.g. chi-square tests). In the case of heterogeneity across 
studies, moderators are detected by sub-grouping studies based on a hypothesized moderator 
variable and testing the homogeneity assumption repeatedly.  
In contrast to the majority of accounting meta-studies which use these classical meta-analysis 
techniques, most modern meta-studies go beyond that methodology and turn to meta-
regressions. An important advantage of this type of analysis is that moderators are considered 
simultaneously (hierarchical analysis). This is especially important as moderator variables are 
often correlated and an isolated consideration may lead to distortions and errors of 
interpretation. Therefore, meta-regression analysis explicitly introduces relevant explanatory 
variables concurrently to investigate the extent to which these can explain heterogeneity in 
primary studies (Harbord and Higgins (2008)).  
39  Further examples include Ahmet et al. (2013): association between discretionary accruals /analysts' forecast 
accuracy and IFRS adoption; Derfuss (2009): relationship of budgetary participation/reliance and accounting 
performance measures; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010): association of board 
independence/ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure; Habib (2012): association between non-
audit service fees and financial reporting quality or Samaha et al. (2015): impact of board and audit 
committee characteristics on voluntary disclosure. 
40  For more information on the procedures see Hunter and Schmidt (2000, 2004) or Lipsey and Wilson (2001). 
41  The procedures and formula calculate the population correlation coefficients (e.g. Pearson correlation 
coefficient) between two constructs using the sample correlations reported in prior empirical research and 
correct for the statistical artifacts of measurement error and sampling error. For more information on the 
formula see Lipsey and Wilson (2001). 
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3.2. Meta-Analysis Procedure and Techniques  
Selection and coding of studies 
As a first step of our meta-analysis, we conduct a comprehensive literature research on the 
issue of book-tax differences/book-tax conformity in common electronic databases and 
editorial sources (Business Source Premier, IDEAS, EconPapers, EconBiz etc.). For this 
purpose, we use the following keywords: “book-tax conformity”, “book-tax differences”, 
“book-tax gap”, “earnings management”, “tax sheltering”, “tax aggressiveness” and “tax 
avoidance”. In addition to that, we scan relevant review papers (e.g. Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010); Graham et al. (2012)), references of collected papers, conference databases as well as 
researcher CVs to identify further empirical studies potentially relevant to our topic. As a 
starting point, we also take into consideration unpublished (working) papers to avoid a 
possible publication bias.42 In the review process of the potential papers, we then screen titles, 
abstracts and descriptions to search for studies that assess a potential association between 
BTD/BTC and earnings management and/or tax sheltering. This proceeding results in a final 
sample consisting of 27 relevant papers43 (24 published and 3 unpublished) between 1998-
2015.  
In a second step, these identified papers are coded by two researchers independently. Coding 
of the studies in particular focuses on the different measures of BTD (e.g. Total BTD, 
Temporary BTD, DTAX, BTC index), whether BTD are actually observed or only 
approximated,44 differences in the dependent variables, i.e. in the diverse earnings 
management and/or tax sheltering measures45, institutional features (e.g. degree of book-tax 
conformity in a respective country; individual vs. consolidated accounts) and design 
characteristics (e.g. OLS vs. Logit/Probit; additional controls for accruals or tax measures). 
Moreover, common key statistics, such as t-values, p-values, sample sizes, standard 
deviations and coefficients are recorded.  
Methodology 
In methodological terms, we rely on meta-regression analysis and thus apply a fairly 
innovative tool in accounting research. 
42  Nevertheless, we are aware that this could imply both strength and weaknesses. Pomeroy and Thornton 
(2008) state that, in principle, aggregating both published and unpublished results accounts for potential 
implications of statistically non-significant results, mitigating publication and replication bias. Unpublished 
studies, however, are likely to exhibit inconsistent research quality since they have not fully survived a peer 
review process.  
43  See Table 1. 
44  See chapter 2 for more information on the different BTD and BTC measures. 
45  See chapter 2 for more information on the different EM and TS measures. 
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As previously discussed, there is substantial diversity with respect to the measurement of 
BTD/BTC as well as with regard to the definition of the proxies for EM and TS in the 
reviewed papers. Therefore, we proceed along the lines of several previous meta-regression 
analyses and rely on t-values as dependent variable of our meta-regression rather than on 
actual coefficients.46 The reason for this is that t-values properly indicate the sign as well as 
the significance level of correlations and that they are fully comparable across studies using 
different variables (Card et al. (2010)). This allows us to draw conclusions across a wide 
range of diverse studies. Estimated coefficients, by contrast, would not be comparable as the 
variables in our sample are not dimensionless, i.e. the studies employ different units and 
constructs (Baskaran et al. (2014)). The dependent and independent variables used in primary 
studies are, for example, scaled differently (e.g. by total assets or revenue) and range from 
dummies and ratios to continuous variables. Therefore, the coefficients differ systematically 
and the estimation of an average effect size47 would not be meaningful in our setting. 
Our basic meta-regression equation is presented in the following:48 
?̂?𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃0 + 𝑋𝑋𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖 
(2)  𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖  specifies the estimated t-value of specification i of primary study s.49 t0 represents the 
intercept and thereby the defined baseline t-value The definition of a baseline is necessary 
because of the kind of coding of the moderator variables. As these are defined as dummy 
variables which basically can be sub-grouped to identify a particular study feature, they are 
mostly self-excluding. If all of these dummies would then be considered simultaneously in the 
regression analysis, there would be perfect multi-collinearity (dummy variable trap). 
Therefore, we define one particular characteristic as the baseline for each subgroup. The 
intercept then captures all baseline features at the same time and the reported coefficients 
have to be interpreted in relation to this baseline (Heinemann et al. (2016), p. 10).50 As 
explained, we expect that heterogeneity in the estimates of primary studies can be explained 
by a vector of variables which describe study-specific characteristics (X: moderating factors) 
as well as sampling error (𝜀𝜀). 
46  For further meta-regression analysis relying on t-values, see Card et al. (2010); Baskaran et al. (2014); 
Klomp and de Haan (2010); Heinemann et al. (2016). 
47  In order to obtain this value, individual study results are combined to an overall or consensus estimate with 
respect to the size of effects by assuming between-study homogeneity (see Heinemann et al. (2016), p. 9). 
48  Standard errors are clustered at study level. 
49  Referring to equation (1), ?̂?𝑃 = 𝛾𝛾
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
� . 
50  For more information on the included moderator variables and the baseline, see chapter 4. 
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4. Results 
Descriptives 
In the following, we present information on the specific characteristics of our MRA sample. 
For this purpose, Table 3 provides an overview of the variables included in the MRA with 
respect to the number of observations and the percentage share in relation to the total number 
of 62 observations, the number of studies employing the respective variable,51 the mean t-
value as well as the minimum and maximum t-values.52  
Table 3: Summary statistics for the variables included in the MRA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First of all, it can be noted that on average the 27 studies in our sample report a positive 
association between BTD and TS/EM indicated by a t-value of 1.44 which, however, lacks 
51  Because several studies employ more than one dependent and independent variable, the sum of studies 
exceeds the total number of studies. 
52  We abstain from weighting observations, e.g. by the inverse of the share of observations per study in relation 
to the full sample, as the number of observations extracted from primary studies is rather equally distributed 
(1-6 specifications per study).  
53  The remaining 15% of the observations represent cross-country studies. This variable is, however, redundant 
to BTC. 
Variable Obs 
% 
sample 
# 
studies 
Mean 
t-
value Min. Max. 
Dependent variable 
     TS 41 66 17 1.55 -5.34 10.40 
EM 21 34 12 1.21 -5.26 4.42 
Independent variable of interest         
Total BTD 32 52 20 1.85 -4.43 5.80 
Other BTD 21 34 13 1.87 -3.89 10.40 
BTC Index 9 15 5 -1.03 -5.34 2.59 
Approxim. BTD 50 81 23 0.85 -5.34 10.40 
Measured BTD 12 19 6 3.88 1.57 5.80 
Level of BTC53             
Low 43 69 19 1.49 -4.43 6.73 
Medium 6 10 4 4.25 1.57 10.40 
High 4 6 2 2.22 -1.96 4.45 
Financial statements           
Consolidated 58 94 24 1.47 -5.34 10.40 
Individual 4 6 3 0.90 -1.96 1.97 
Methodology             
OLS 30 48 16 1.74 -5.34 10.40 
Logit/Probit 32 52 14 1.15 -4.43 4.45 
Controls (for)             
DA/TA 21 34 13 1.06 -5.25 4.42 
ETR/UTB 10 16 4 -0.13 -4.43 2.47 
Other BTD 7 11 3 0.79 -0.53 2.47 
Total 62 100 27 1.44 -5.34 10.40 
Note: “EM” signifies Earnings Management; “TS” signifies Tax sheltering. The categorization of the topic is based on our 
own assessment of the analyzed papers. “BTD” means Book-Tax Difference; “BTC” means Book-Tax Conformity. “OLS” 
refers to Ordinary Least Squares. “DA (TA)” refers to Discretionary (Total) Accruals; “ETR” signifies Effective Tax Rate; 
“UTB” means “Unrecognized Tax Benefit”. For all measures/definitions see chapter 2. 
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statistical significance at conventional levels.54 In addition, there is a great variety in results 
ranging from highly significant negative (t-value of -5.34) to highly significant positive 
effects (t-value of 10.4). 
Table 3 further reports differences regarding the dependent as well as the independent 
variables applied in primary studies. Due to our comparably small sample size (62 obs.), we 
aggregate categories such that we only differentiate between EM and TS proxies in general 
instead of examining all eight categories of dependent variables discussed in chapter 2 
separately; otherwise, there would be too few observations per single category. The same 
applies to the measurement of the independent variable of interest. Therefore, we distinguish 
between Total BTD, Other BTD including all measures which try to capture BTD more 
precisely (including: Temporary BTD, Discretionary BTD, Permanent BTD, DTAX, BTD 
with the effect of tax sheltering removed, Discretionary Total BTD DD) and cross-country 
studies using a BTC index. Concerning the dependent variable, more studies in our sample 
examine TS (66%) than EM (34%). Although the mean t-values of both groups exhibit a 
positive sign, they lack statistical significance. In addition, min and max t-values demonstrate 
substantial heterogeneity in the results of primary studies (ranging from negative significant 
to positive significant findings). With regard to the independent variable of interest, more than 
half of our sample use Total BTD (52%), whereas only 34 % rely on other, more specific, 
BTD measures. The mean of both BTD groups’ t-values is positive and indicates significance 
at the 10% level. There is, however, again great heterogeneity in results. Studies analyzing a 
BTC index (15%), by contrast, report an overall negative, but insignificant t-value. The 
negative sign is plausible as a large BTC index implies a high degree of conformity in a given 
country. This in turn is expected to go along with lower BTD and therefore less EM and TS 
(inverse correlation). A further important feature of the independent variable is whether BTD 
are actually measured or only approximated from financial statement information. 19% of our 
sample measure BTD based on real tax return data, whereas 81% only estimate the variable 
using financial statement information. Remarkably, the mean t-value of studies measuring 
BTD is considerably higher (3.88) compared to the mean t-value of studies approximating 
BTD (0.85) and indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Furthermore, there is less 
variation in t-values, all pointing into the same direction (positive association). 
54  We refer to a critical t-value of 1.65 at 10 % level significance, 1.96 at 5% level and 2.58 at 1% level 
significance. 
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In addition, the following graphical analysis employing boxplots (Figure 1) serves to illustrate 
the heterogeneity of studies with regard to their dependent and independent variable 
measurement and is intended to provide further insights into the distribution of t-values. 
Figure 1: Boxplot for the classification of the dependent and independent variable 
   
Note: This graphic illustrates/compares the overall association between measures of tax sheltering and earnings management 
with BTD (aggregate of all BTD/BTC measures).  
   
Note: These graphics illustrate the association between different kinds of BTD/BTC measures and opportunistic reporting 
behavior (both EM and TS).  
 
The boxes’ margins indicate the 25% and 75% quartiles whereas the vertical line in between 
displays the respective median t-value. The antennas span 1.5 times the interquartile range 
and the single dots represent outliers. The red line marks the 5%-threshold for statistical 
significance (t-value = 1.9655) (Heinemann et al. (2016)) indicating that values to the right of 
this line reflect a significant positive association. Comparing the boxplots for TS or EM as 
dependent variable, it is obvious that 50% of the EM sample reports statistically significant 
positive results, whereas the median t-value for studies examining TS is slightly below the 5% 
threshold which implies that less than 50% of TS studies find a significant positive relation. 
Furthermore, papers using TS proxies as dependent variable exhibit considerably more 
variation in results. The lower section of Figure 1 compares boxplots for the different 
measures of the independent variable. While almost fifty percent of the studies using Total 
55  This corresponds to the critical value of the t-distribution at the 5 % threshold. 
-5 0 5 10
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-5 0 5 10
t-stat
BTC
Other BTD
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BTD find a positive and significant association, there is extreme scattering in results also 
covering studies that report a significant negative relationship. Papers that exploit Other 
BTD56 measures, by contrast, find less significant positive results, but entail, at the same time, 
lower dispersion (e.g. almost no significant negative results). Analyses relying on BTC 
indices find significant positive results in only a few cases. In line with the alleged reversed 
association between BTC and BTD, most of these papers report (significant) negative effects. 
Finally, it is remarkable that almost all studies employing measured BTD consistently report 
significant positive results, whereas there is great variation in findings and a large share of 
insignificant results of studies which only approximate BTD. Hence, studies based on actual 
tax return data seem to be able to capture opportunistic reporting behavior very well.   
Lastly, Table 3 contains further variables included as controls in the MRA. First, the level of 
book-tax conformity in the respective country, distinguishing between low, high and medium 
BTC, is considered. The majority of studies in our sample (69%) are conducted in a low BTC 
country. This makes sense as most investigations examine the US setting. With regard to the 
type of financial statements, almost all papers use data from consolidated (94%) instead of 
individual accounts for their analysis. From a methodological point of view, approximately 
half of the studies (48%) conduct an OLS regression analysis, whereas the other half (52%) 
relies on Logit/Probit analyses, i.e. on a binary dependent variable. Furthermore, some studies 
additionally control for discretionary and/or total accruals (34%), for tax avoidance measures 
such as ETR and/or UTB (16%), or for the fact that more than one BTD measure is 
considered in their regression simultaneously (11%). 
Meta-Regression Analysis Results 
As outlined in chapter 3, our meta-regression analysis requires the definition of a baseline. To 
that end, our baseline is specified as an estimation of the association between approximated 
BTD, captured via Other BTD proxies, and TS in a country with a low level of BTC using 
data from consolidated financial accounts and applying an OLS regression analysis. The 
selection of the baseline is primarily based on the most common study features in our sample 
(see Table 3). An important exception represents the BTD proxy. While Total BTD is used 
most frequently, Other BTD measures are expected to capture TS and EM behavior more 
precisely and are therefore included in our baseline. Taken together, all the baseline features 
are contained in the intercept of the MRA. The other reported coefficients have to be 
56  Specifically, these include: Temporary BTD, Discretionary BTD, Permanent BTD, DTAX, BTD with the 
effect of tax sheltering removed and Discretionary Total BTD DD. 
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interpreted relative to this baseline and present the impact of a deviation in this particular 
feature from the baseline (Heinemann et al. (2016)). 
Table 4 summarizes our estimation results.57 Column (1) presents the results of the main 
specification including the study features outlined above. While we report the basic 
coefficients on the left-hand side, we additionally present the results of a joint F-test in 
column “Joint effect baseline” in order to examine whether our baseline modified by the 
respective variable (specific study feature) exhibits (joint) significance. Furthermore, we 
extend the main specification and vary the sample composition in order to test the robustness 
of our results. First, we include three additional control variables in our MRA, i.e. dummies 
capturing whether studies control for DA/TA, for UTB/ETR and/or for Other BTD measures 
(column (2)). The second extension relates to the analysis of a potential publication bias. In 
this regard, we exclude unpublished (working) papers (column (3) and (4)) to examine 
whether our results remain unchanged when we only investigate published studies. 
 
57  The table is divided into subsections by headlines indicating the respective group of study features as well as 
their respective baseline category. The definition of the baseline study is constant throughout all 
specifications. It uses TS as dependent variable, approximated other BTD measures as independent variable, 
relies on consolidated financial statement data in a low BTC country, and uses OLS as methodological 
approach. 
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Table 4: Meta-Regression Analysis - Results 
  
(1) 
Main 
specification 
 
Joint 
effect 
baseline 
 
(2) 
With 
controls 
 
Joint 
effect 
baseline 
 
(3) 
Main 
specification, 
published 
 
Joint 
effect 
baseline 
 
(4) 
With 
controls, 
published 
 
Joint 
effect 
baseline   
Baseline effect 2.16 
  
  2.46 
  
  2.93 
  
  3.3 
  
  
  [2.18] **     [1.97] *     [2.36] **     [2.37] **     
Dependent variable, Baseline: TS 
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
EM 1.41 
 
3.57 ** 1.07 
 
3.53 * 1.23 
 
4.16 ** 0.7 
 
4.00 ** 
 
[1.22] 
  
  [0.83 
  
  [0.98] 
  
   [0.46] 
  
  
BTD measure, Baseline: Other BTD 
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Total BTD -1.05 
 
1.11   -0.82 
 
1.64   -1.04 
 
1.89 * -0.87 
 
2.43 * 
 
[-1.76] * 
 
  [-1.25] 
  
  [-1.59] 
  
  [-1.19] 
  
  
         
BTC Index -3.99 
 
-1.83 * -4.05 
 
-1.59 * -4.58 
 
-1.65 ** -4.65 
 
-1.35 ** 
 
[-2.01] * 
 
  [-1.86] * 
 
  [-2.17] **
 
  [-2.03] ** 
 
  
            
Measured BTD, Baseline: Approximate 2.62 
 
4.78 *** 2.15 
 
4.61 *** 1.88 
 
4.81 *** 1.39 
 
4.69 *** 
 
[1.73] * 
 
  [1.32] 
  
  [1.13] 
  
  [0.80] 
  
  
Level of BTC, Baseline: Low 
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Medium 1.22 
 
3.38   1.12 
 
3.58   1.93 
 
4.86 * 1.74 
 
5.04 * 
 
[0.59] 
  
  [0.55] 
  
  [1.19] 
  
  [1.09] 
  
  
High 0.42 
 
2.58   0.25 
 
2.71   0.64 
 
3.57 * 0.7 
 
4.00 * 
 
[0.28] 
  
  [0.16] 
  
  [0.44] 
  
  [0.42] 
  
  
Financial statements, Baseline: Consolidated 
  
  
    
  
   
  
  
  
Single -1.39 
 
0.77   -1.36 
 
1.10  -1.82 
 
1.11 * -1.86 
 
1.44 * 
 
[-0.72] 
  
  [-0.69] 
  
  [-0.86] 
  
  [-0.80] 
  
  
Methdology, Baseline: OLS  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Binary -1.25 
 
0.91   -1.20 
 
1.26   -1.91 
 
1.02 * -2.05 
 
1.25 * 
 
[-1.53] 
  
  [-1.34] 
  
  [-1.85] *
 
  [-1.71] 
  
  
Controls 
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
DA / TA 
   
  -0.08 
 
2.38   
   
  0.55 
 
3.85 * 
    
  [-0.08] 
  
  
   
  [0.43] 
  
  
UTB / ETR 
   
  -1.47 
 
0.99 ** 
   
  -1.87 
 
1.43 ** 
    
  [-2.36] ** 
 
  
   
  [-2.61] ** 
 
  
Other BTD 
   
  0.51 
 
2.97 *** 
   
  0.45 
 
3.75 *** 
    
  [0.92] 
  
  
   
  [0.73] 
  
  
N 62   62  55   55  
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Notes: Clustered t-statistics in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. “EM” signifies Earnings Management; “TS” signifies Tax sheltering. The categorization of the 
topic is based on our own assessment of the analyzed papers. “BTD” refers to Book-Tax Differences; “BTC” means Book-Tax Conformity. “OLS” refers to Ordinary Least 
Squares. “DA (TA)” refers to Discretionary (Total) Accruals; “ETR” signifies Effective Tax Rate; “UTB” means “Unrecognized Tax Benefit”. For all measures/definitions see 
chapter 2.  
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For the main specification (column (1)), the average consensus t-value for the baseline study 
is equal to 2.16. More precisely, primary studies exhibiting the design features defined above 
are found to report, on average, a positive and statistically significant association between 
BTD and TS at the 5% level. This also applies to the specification including additional control 
variables (column (2)). In addition, coefficients are estimated with statistical precision at the 5 
% level. This holds true for all specifications in Table 4 (except for column (2): at the 10% 
level). The baselines in the specifications considering only published studies (columns (3) and 
(4)) even indicate a positive and statistically significant association at the 1% level. This hints 
at a potential publication bias. Results obtained from (refereed) journal articles seem to be, on 
average, associated with higher levels of statistical significance compared to those obtained 
from working papers.  
Relative to the baseline, variation in the dependent variable, i.e. assessing EM instead of TS, 
basically leads to the same result, i.e. to a positive and statistically significant association with 
BTD. Nevertheless, the average consensus t-value increases (3.57 = 2.16+1.41 = baseline 
effect + coefficient for EM) indicating a higher level of significance (at the 1% level) 
compared to the baseline. This implies an even stronger association between BTD and EM 
proxies (in all specifications). Coefficients are again estimated with statistical precision (see 
column “Joint effect baseline”). As a first interim conclusion, it can therefore be noted that 
BTD seem to capture opportunistic reporting behavior and serve as a positive indicator for 
both TS as well as EM. However, they seem to be an even better signal for EM.  
Variation in the independent variable, i.e. the BTD/BTC measure, changes results more 
substantially. Using Total BTD instead of Other BTD exerts an inverse influence (coefficient: 
-1.05) leading to an average positive t-value of 1.11 which indicates significance above the 10 
% threshold. Thus, an overall significant association between BTD (measured as Total BTD) 
and TS can no longer be recorded. This implies that the explanatory power of BTD for EM 
and TS strongly depends on how precisely BTD are measured. This also holds true for the 
specification including additional controls (column (2)). Therefore, Total BTD being only a 
rough estimate of the book-tax gap seem to capture opportunistic reporting behavior worse 
than Other BTD measures (Temporary BTD, Discretionary BTD, Permanent BTD, DTAX, 
BTD with the effect of tax sheltering removed, Discretionary Total BTD according to 
Desai/Dharmapala) which are more explicitly aimed at approximating EM and TS behavior. 
This can also be interpreted as evidence for the suspected measurement error associated with 
Total BTD (see chapter 2). The analysis of the specifications which examine only published 
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studies (column (3) and (4)) provides a further hint for a potential publication bias. The 
overall positive t-values (1.89, 2.43) indicate significance at the 10% (column (3)) and 5% 
level (column (4)) and point to studies published in (refereed) journals being generally more 
likely to report positive and statistically significant effects. Using a BTC Index instead of 
Other BTD exerts an even stronger negative influence (coefficient: -3.99) which results in an 
overall negative t-value of 1.83, implying significance at the 10% level. This is plausible as 
there is an assumed reversed association between BTC and BTD. This effect seems, however, 
not to be stable across the other specifications as the joint overall t-values lie above the 10%-
threshold of -1.65 (see columns (2) - (4)). 
Varying the kind of measurement of BTD exerts the strongest influence on results. Using 
actually observed instead of approximated BTD implies an average t-value of 4.78 and, thus, 
a statistically significant positive association at the 1% level (for all specifications).58 This 
provides evidence for measured BTD capturing TS and EM behavior more reliably and more 
precisely than only approximated BTD and is in line with the arguments brought forward by 
Hanlon (2003) and McGill and Outslay (2004). In particular, they point at the various 
problems related to the estimation of taxable income from financial accounts resulting from 
tax disclosures in financial statements being insufficient to draw valid conclusions about 
taxable income and actual taxes paid in a given fiscal year (see chapter 2). 
To sum up, our MRA results point to an overall statistically significant and positive 
association between BTD and opportunistic reporting behavior. This implies that BTD are 
indeed indicative of both EM and TS, and even better so of EM. The results are, however, 
weaker for studies that only capture BTD roughly based on Total BTD instead of using more 
precise proxies (such as DTAX, Temporary BTD etc.). Moreover, examining actual BTD 
computed from tax returns instead of only approximating them from financial statements 
strongly increases the effects. Even though we cannot draw a definite conclusion with regard 
to BTC, our results suggest a negative association with EM and TS. This is also substantiated 
by the provided evidence on a positive relation between BTD and aggressive reporting, given 
the inverse correlation between BTD and BTC outlined above. Hence, our results support the 
findings of Tang (2015) pointing to a restrictive impact of book-tax conformity with regard to 
EM and TS. 
58  Coefficients are estimated with statistical precision at the 1 % level (see column joint effect baseline). 
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5. Conclusion 
The empirical literature on the relation between book-tax differences (BTD)/book-tax 
conformity (BTC) and opportunistic reporting has been growing quickly over the last decade. 
Specifically, these studies analyze the association between BTD and earnings management 
(EM) and/or tax sheltering (TS) to evaluate whether BTD can indeed serve as an indicator for 
opportunistic reporting behavior. Heterogeneity in measures used as well as in reported 
findings induces us to conduct a comprehensive and systematic literature review as well as a 
quantitative meta-analysis.  
The systematic literature review reveals the use of various BTD measures in empirical tax 
accounting research. While the majority of studies use Total BTD as a rough estimate of the 
book-tax gap, other investigations exploit more specific proxies, such as Temporary BTD, 
Discretionary Permanent BTD (DTAX) or Discretionary Total BTD. Moreover, only a 
minority of investigations is based on actual tax return data, while most studies have to rely 
on BTD measures estimated from financial accounts. In addition to that, more recent studies 
also develop particular index-based measures for BTC by means of cross-country studies. 
Similarly, there are numerous variables used to capture EM and/or TS. To name just a few, 
these include binary variables indicating whether a firm has been identified as being engaged 
in tax sheltering or financial statement fraud, tax audit adjustments or discretionary accruals.  
Beyond a qualitative review, the literature has reached a critical mass (27 studies) rendering 
meta-regression analysis feasible and appropriate to quantitatively summarize the overall 
evidence on the association between BTD/BTC and opportunistic reporting. This constitutes a 
rather innovative approach, given that there are only a few meta-studies in the accounting 
literature so far and considering that these utilize more basic methodological techniques such 
as simple homogeneity analyses.  
Our meta-regression analysis (MRA) results point to a consensus estimate of a statistically 
significant and positive association between BTD and TS as well as between BTD and EM. 
The obtained results indicate a level of significance at the 5% threshold for TS and even at the 
1% threshold for EM. This indicates that BTD are indeed indicative of both EM and TS, and 
even more so of EM. These results are, however, weaker for studies that only capture BTD 
roughly based on Total BTD instead of using more precise proxies. Moreover, examining 
actual BTD computed from tax returns instead of only approximating them from financial 
statements strongly increases the effects. Hence, efforts taken to accurately determine BTD 
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seem to be worth wile when it comes to the explanatory power for opportunistic reporting. 
Furthermore, our results as well as the alleged inverse correlation between BTC and BTD 
suggest a negative association between BTC and EM/TS. Hence, we would conclude that 
higher conformity is indeed effective in reducing aggressive reporting. In addition, our MRA 
hints at the existence of a potential publication bias in the tax accounting literature.  
Finally, the fact that there exist no uniform definitions and standards for both BTD/BTC and 
EM/TS, giving rise to a variety of different measures used,59 constitutes motivation and 
limitation of our study at the same time. This heterogeneity can also be traced back to data 
availability issues, e.g. tax return data or data on actual (tax or financial) fraud are mostly not 
accessible. Therefore, researchers have to rely on diverse proxies. As our overall sample size 
is comparably small, we do not obtain enough observations for each single category of 
BTD/BTC and EM/TS measures. Hence, we have to condense those in order to be able to 
conduct systematic analyses. This, however, possibly comes along with measurement 
imprecisions. Moreover, several moderator variables (such as the level of BTC or the type of 
financial statement) could not be further exploited in our MRA because of an unbalanced 
distribution of sample characteristics.  
  
59  This is a major difference to other meta-studies in the field of taxation, e.g. on the impact of taxes on FDI, 
see Feld and Heckemeyer (2011). 
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